On this date, June 22, 1945, an Imperial Japanese Lieutenant General Isamu Chō, committed seppuku in Okinawa. I will post information about him from Wikipedia and other links.
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General Isamu Chō (長勇Chō Isamu) |
Born | January 19, 1895 Fukuoka prefecture, Japan |
Died | June 22, 1945 (aged 50) Okinawa prefecture, Japan |
Allegiance | Empire of Japan |
Service/branch | |
Years of service | 1916 - 1945 |
Rank | Lieutenant General |
Commands held | |
Battles/wars | Second Sino-Japanese War World War II |
Isamu Chō(長勇Chō Isamu, 19 January 1895 – 22 June 1945) was an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army known for his support of ultranationalist politics and involvement in a number of attempted military and right-wingcoup d'états in pre-World War II Japan.
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Biography
Chō was a native of Fukuoka prefecture. He graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1916 and from the Army Staff College in 1928.
After he received his commission, Chō was assigned to his first duty outside Japan with the politicized Kwantung Army based in eastern China. He returned to play a very active role in internal politics within the Japanese army, and was an active or indirect participant in the March Incident and the Imperial Colors Incident (with other leaders: Kingoro Hashimoto, Jirō Minami, Sadao Araki for the military, and nationalists Ikki Kita, Shūmei Ōkawa, Kanichiro Kamei, Kozaburo Tachibana and Mitsuru Toyama). He was a founder of the radical "Sakura Kai" secret society, whose aim was to overthrow the democratic government in favor of a state socialist regime which would stamp out corruption.
At the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chō was commander of the IJA 74th Infantry Regiment of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, attached to Japanese Central China Area Army, and based in Manchukuo. At the Battle of Nanjing, he was aide-de-camp to Prince Asaka and is thought to have been complicit in ordering the massacre of prisoners of war, but it is disputed whether he obeyed an order from the prince, or whether he acted on his own.
Chō was subsequently involved in a number of border incidents between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union as Chief of Staff of the IJA 26th Division from 1939 to 1940. In 1940, he was transferred briefly to the Taiwan Army of Japan Headquarters, and then became Chief of Staff of the Indochina Expeditionary Army from 1940 to 1941.
Chō was Vice Chief of Staff of Unit 82 within the Military Affairs Bureau, in the Ministry of War in 1941, and participated in the strategic and tactical planning for the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia. From 1941 to 1942, he accompanied the Southern Army to French Indochina to oversee implementation of Japanese strategy, and served as a liaison officer between the Southern Army and the 14th Army in the Philippines.
From 1942 until 1944, Chō was commander of the IJA 10th Division, a garrison force based in Manchukuo. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1944, he served in the Kwangtung Army Headquarters, and later as commander of the 1st Mobile Brigade.
In 1945, Chō was Chief of Staff of the 32nd Army during the Battle of Okinawa and masterminded the elaborate underground fortifications around Shuri Castle, but favored a highly aggressive response to the American invasion rather than a passive defense. He persuaded General Mitsuru Ushijima to launch the disastrous 5 May 1945 counteroffensive. He committed seppukualongside Ushijima on 22 June 1945 rather than surrender to the American forces.
Cho was regarded as an quick tempered, offensive, zealous officer who was known to strike subordinates when angry or frustrated.
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JAPANESE COMMANDERS on Okinawa (photographed early in February 1945). In center: (1) Admiral Minoru Ota, (2) Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima, (3) Lt. Gen. Isamu Cho, (4) Col. Hitoshi Kanayama, (5) Col. Kikuji Hongo, and (6) Col. Hiromichi Yahara. |
INTERNET SOURCE: http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/C/h/Cho_Isamu.htm
Cho had a reputation for slapping his subordinates and for overindulging in smoking, drinking, and women. He was ruthless in his treatment of the Okinawans, relocating those who could not be evacuated by ship to the wild northern regions of the island and announcing that the Army would seize all food supplies when the enemy landed. "The army's mission ... was to win, and it would not allow itself to be defeated by helping starving civilians" (Drea 2009). His final message included the assertion that "I depart without regret, shame or obligations" (Gilbert 1989).
Service record
1894 | Born | |
1937-8-15 | Lieutenant colonel | Chief, 2 Section, Shanghai Expeditionary ForceEdgerton (1997) |
1937-10-20 | Chief of staff, 10 Army | |
1938-7-15 | Colonel | Commander, 74 Regiment, Manchuria |
1939-3-9 | Chief of staff, 26 Division | |
1940-8-1 | Taiwan Army Headquarters | |
1940-9-7 | Chief of staff, Indochina Expeditionary Army | |
1941-6-28 | Vice chief of staff, 25 Army | |
1941-9-26 | Military Affairs Bureau, Ministry of War | |
1941-10-15 | Major general | Vice chief of staff, Unit 82 |
1941-11 | Head, Southern Army Special Agency | |
1942 | Southern Army Liaison Officer to 14 Army | |
1942-7-9 | Military Affairs Bureau, Ministry of War | |
1942-11-10 | Commander, Infantry Group, 10 Division | |
1944-3-1 | Kwantung Army Headquarters | |
1944-3-1 | Commander, 1 Mobile Brigade | |
1944-6-26 | General Staff | |
1944-7-8 | Chief of staff, 32 Army | |
1945-3-1 | Lieutenant general | |
1945-6-21 |